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I. Introduction
Florida plaintiffs injured by the negligence of others face a famil-
iar obstacle in our court system in their pursuit of compensation for
their injuries. Florida is experiencing the reemergence of the traditional
defense of assumption of risk. This defense, if proved, can completely
bar a plaintiff's recovery of damages.'
In 1977, the Florida Supreme Court, in the landmark case of
Blackburn v. Dorta,2 sought to eliminate the confusion arising from
judicial applications of the defense by merging the defense of implied
assumption of risk3 into the defense of contributory negligence.4 Since
the plaintiff's recovery could be reduced according to fault, although
not completely prohibited,5 legal commentators believed that the elimi-
nation of this defense would benefit the treatment of a negligence
action.6
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A (1956); See generally Comment,
Assumption of Risk - Adoption of Comparative Negligence, 6 FLA. ST. L. REV. 211
(1978); James, Assumption of Risk, 61 YALE L.J. 141 (1952).
2. 348 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1977).
3. Implied assumption of risk exists when the plaintiff's consent to assume a risk
is implied from his conduct, rather than from an express agreement. For example, a
person playing golf assumes all obvious and ordinary risks of the game even though he
has not entered into an actual agreement to do so. Brady v. Kane, 111 So. 2d 472 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
4. The defense of contributory negligence eliminates or reduces the defendant's
liability because the plaintiff contributed to his own injury by failing to act reasonably.
For example, a person who is injured by walking in a dangerously darkened area may
be contributorily negligent because he failed to look out for his own safety. Brandt v.
Van Zandt, 77 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1954) (en banc).
5. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (1973). The principles of comparative negli-
gence require that the plaintiff's recovery be reduced in proportion to his fault. See
generally Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH. L. REV. 465 (1953); Turk, Com-
parative Negligence on the March, 28 CHI-KENT L. REV. 189 (1950).
6. Legal commentators have stated their dissatisfaction with the doctrine of as-
sumption of risk:
The expression, assumption of risk, is a very confusing one. In application
it conceals many policy issues, and it is constantly being used to beg the
real question. Accurate analysis in the law of negligence would probably
1
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However, the Blackburn holding did not address the separate de-
fense of express assumption of risk,7 which remains a total bar to the
recovery of damages in negligence actions. Unfortunately, the Black-
burn court's statement in dicta, concerning the disposition of express
assumption of risk,8 has resulted in a plethora of interpretations which
have led to an expansion of the doctrine beyond its traditional and his-
toric meaning.'
be advanced if the term were eradicated and the cases divided under the
topic of consent, lack of duty, and contributory negligence. Then the true
issues involved would be more clearly presented and the determinations,
whether by judge or jury, could be more accurately and realistically
rendered.
Wade, The Place of Assumption of Risk in the Law of Negligence, 22 LA. L. REv. 5,
14 (1961).
"Except for express assumption of risk, the term and concept, assumption of risk,
should be abolished. It adds nothing to modern law except confusion." James, Assump-
tion of Risk, 61 YALE L. J. 141, 169 (1952).
Upon close analysis, it becomes apparent that the defense traditionally
known as 'implied assumption of risk' is in reality nothing more than a
particular form of contributory negligence . . . . Since in negligence cases,
with the advent of comparative fault, it has become totally superfluous, it
should be abolished by name in these cases. Its perpetuation can only lead
to confusion and error.
Kionka, Implied Assumption of Risk: Does It Survive Comparative Fault?, 3 So. ILL.
U.L.J. 371, 400 (1982).
In the decade . . . [since] . . . 1956 there came to be substantial judicial
and scholarly support for the point of view . . . that the doctrine deserves
no existence (except for express assumption of risk) and is simply a confus-
ing way of stating no duty rules or, where there has been a breach of duty
toward plaintiff, simply one kind of contributory negligence.
James, Assumption of Risk: Unhappy Reincarnation, 78 YALE L.J. 185, 186-88
(1968). See generally Symposium: Assumption of Risk, 22 LA. L. REV. 1-166 (1961).
7. Blackburn, 348 So. 2d at 290. The defense of express assumption of risk is
characterized by an actual agreement, made in advance, that the defendant will not be
responsible for injuries to the plaintiff caused by specific risks. See generally McClain,
Contractual Limitation of Liability for Negligence, 28 HARv. L. REV. 550 (1915).
8. Blackburn, 348 So. 2d at 290.
9.
As a general rule, the doctrine of assumption of risk pertains to controver-
sies between masters and servants, though circumstances may arise be-
tween parties other than masters and servants when the doctrine may ap-
ply; but such defense is never available, unless it rests on contract, or . ..
an act done so spontaneously by the party against whom the defense is
invoked that he was volunteer, and any bad result of the act must be at-
tributed to an exercise of his free volition, instead of to the conduct of his
1344 [Vol. 10
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The effect of this expansion can be devastating to injured plain-
tiffs. For example, a jockey was paralyzed as a result of an incident
which occurred during a race.1" The jury decided that the cause of this
injury was the negligence of the owners of the racetrack. They also
found that the jockey was not at fault. The jury awarded the jockey ten
million in damages. However, the Third District Court of Appeal held
that the jockey should be denied recovery because the jury found that
he had expressly assumed the risk of injury.1
This note suggests that Florida court decisions since Blackburn
have clouded the distinction between express and implied assumption of
risk. Consequently, what the Blackburn court sought to eliminate from
Florida tort law has now been revived by judicial opinions enlarging the
conduct which can be labeled as express assumption of risk.
This avoidance of the Blackburn mandate can be seen by an ex-
amination of recent decisions which expand and redefine a plaintiff's
express assumption of the risk of injury. 2 This note will examine Flor-
ida decisions conflicting with Blackburn, as well as possible options
available to the supreme court concerning the doctrine of assumption of
risk.
II. The Doctrine of Assumption of Risk
A. History
The doctrine of assumption of risk emerged from the master-ser-
vant relationship in the late nineteenth century.13 This doctrine was
adversary.
Cooney-Eckstein Co. v. King, 69 Fla. 246, 254, 67 So. 918, 921 (1915) (quoting Tinkle
v. St. Louis & San Francisco R.R. Co., 212 Mo. 445, 450, 110 S.W. 1086, 1093
(1908) (emphasis added). See generally Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of Risk, 20
HARV. L. REV. 14 (1906).
10. Ashcroft v. Calder Race Course, Inc., 464 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1985), rev'd, 492 So. 2d 1309 (Fla. 1986).
11. Id. at 1252.
12. See Strickland v. Roberts, 382 So. 2d 1338 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), rev.
denied, 389 So. 2d 1115 (Fla. 1980). See also O'Connell v. Walt Disney World Co.,
413 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Gary v. Party Time Co., Inc., 434 So.
2d 338 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Van Tuyn v. Zurich American Ins. Co., 447 So.
2d 318 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Ashcroft v. Calder Race Course, Inc., 464 So.
2d 1250 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985), rev'd, 492 So. 2d 1309 (Fla. 1986); Robbins v.
Dept. of Natural Resources, 468 So. 2d 1041 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
13. H. LABATT, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MASTER & SERVANT § 115 at
19861 1345
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used in several distinct ways to excuse the master from liability when a
servant was injured because of the master's negligence.1 4 The applica-
tion of assumption of risk eased the development of the Industrial
Revolution by reducing the cost of "human overhead."' 5 The added
expense of compensating an employee for injuries which occurred at
work was avoided. As a result, the cost of doing business was lowered. 6
The employer owed the employee the duty to act as a reasonable
person in a comparable situation.' 7 For example, the master's duty to
his servant was to provide a reasonably safe place to work.' 8 However,
the master did not have a duty to protect his servants from risks which
were inherent in the particular employment."9 In order to hold a master
responsible for negligence the servant would have to demonstrate that
his injuries did not result from these inherent risks.2 0 Consequently, ei-
ther the master had not violated his obligation to the servant or he had
no duty to protect the servant from the cause of his injury.2'
In addition, if the servant proved that the master was negligent,
the master could employ the doctrine of assumption of risk as a de-
fense.22 This aspect of the doctrine stated that if the servant continued
to work at the master's place of business despite knowledge of the dan-
ger, the master was absolved from liability.23
305 (2d ed. 1913).
14. Martin v. Des Moines Edison Light Co., 131 Iowa 724, 730, 106 N.W. 359,
361 (1906).
15. Tiller v. Atlantic Coastline R.Y., 318 U.S. 54, 59 (1943). See generally
Pound, Economic Interpretation and the Law of Torts, 53 HARV. L. REV. 365 (1940).
16. "The assumption of risk doctrine. . . was attributed by this Court to a rule
of public policy inasmuch as an opposite doctrine would not only subject employers to
unreasonable and often ruinous responsibilities, thereby embarrassing all branches of
business but would also encourage carelessness on the part of the employee." Tiller v.
Atlantic Coastline Ry. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 59 (1943) (quoting Mr. Justice Bradley in
Tuttle v. Detroit, Grand Haven & Milwaukee Ry., 122 U.S. 189, 196 (1887)).
17. Martin, 106 N.W. at 361.
18. Bartholf v. Baker, 71 So. 2d 480, 482 (Fla. 1954) (en banc). See Tampa
Shipbuilding & Eng. Co. v. Thomas, 131 Fla. 650, 179 So. 705 (1938).
19. See Wilson & Toomer Fertilizer Co. v. Lee, 90 Fla. 632, 106 So. 462 (1924).
See also 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAW OF TORTS § 21.4 at 1178 (1956).
20. 3 H. LABATr, supra note 13, at 3188. See, e.g., Swanson v. Miami Home
Milk Producers' Ass'n, 117 Fla. 110, 157 So. 415 (1934).
21. The first case of note in this area was Priestly v. Fowler, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030
(1837).
22. Gallespie v. Thornton, 95 Fla. 5, 117 So. 714 (1927).
23. Id.
[Vol. 101346
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The basis of the master-servant relationship is contractual.2 The
master agrees to pay the servant and the servant agrees to perform
specific tasks for the master. Logically, the doctrine of assumption of
risk was also implemented in contractual agreements independent of
master-servant relationships.25 Parties were free to enter into contracts
which contained exculpatory clauses. These clauses shifted the burden
of loss or injury. The party was said to have assumed the risk.26
As assumption of risk evolved, the courts utilized the doctrine to
describe different concepts. Courts used assumption of risk to define
the scope of the master's duty, the consent of the servant to work with
knowledge of specific dangers, and express agreements to shift the risk
of loss. Courts and commentators attempted to clarify the ensuing con-
fusion by assigning labels and differentiating among several variations
of the doctrine. This effort was unsuccessful, however, and assumption
of risk became commingled with other traditional defenses to
negligence.28
B. Assumption of Risk: A General Definition
The doctrine of assumption of risk includes several concepts. Gen-
erally, the doctrine refers to situations where a party voluntarily con-
sents to encounter a known risk. 9 The doctrine is divided into two ba-
sic areas: implied and express assumption of risk.
Express assumption of risk is traditionally characterized as an ac-
tual agreement between two parties who agree to shift the risk of loss.30
One party agrees to assume the risk of injury, and the other party is
relieved from liability. The agreement may be either oral or written.31
Although these agreements are not favored by the courts, they will be
24. See, e.g., Southern Turpentine Co. v. Douglass, 61 Fla. 424, 54 So. 385
(1911).
25. Fowler v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 121 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1960).
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496B (1965).
27. See Keeton, Assumption of Risk in Product Liability Cases, 22 LA. L. REV.
122 (1962).
28. See Green, Assumed Risk as a Defense, 22 LA. L. REV. 77 (1961); Wade,
The Place of Assumption of Risk in the Law of Negligence, 22 LA. L. REV. 5 (1961);
James, Assumption of Risk: Unhappy Reincarnation, 78 YALE L. REV. 85 (1968).
29. Bartholf, 71 So. 2d at 483.
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A (1965).
31. Id.
1986] 1347
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upheld if certain conditions are met.32 First, the intention of assuming
the risk must be clear and unequivocal.3 3 Second, the parties to the
agreement must have comparable bargaining power.34 Third, the agree-
ment must not be against public policy. 5 For example, an agreement
between an employer and employee whereby the employee assumes all
risks of injury will not be upheld.36 The employer would be using his
superior bargaining position to take advantage of an employee; the em-
ployee's agreement may be the result of economic necessity.37
Implied assumption of risk is divided into two subcategories: pri-
mary and secondary implied assumption of risk. 8 In a negligence ac-
tion, primary implied assumption of risk focuses on the scope of the
defendant's duty. It is used when the defendant either had no duty to
prevent the plaintiff's injury, or he had a duty but did not breach it."9
For example, if a train passanger falls as a result of the normal jostling
movement of the train, the passenger can not recover damages from the
railway company. The train company does not have a duty to protect
its passengers from normal movement of the train. 0
Primary implied assumption of risk, like negligence, focuses on the
duty owed by a negligent defendant to the injured party.4 This doc-
trine applies to activities which have built-ih and unavoidable risks.
Therefore, the scope of the defendant's duty does not extend to protect-
ing the plaintiff from injuries caused by these specific dangers.42 In this
context, assumption of risk is just another way of saying that the de-
fendant is not negligent, since no breach of duty could have caused the
plaintiff to suffer injury.
Secondary implied assumption of risk is an affirmative defense
which can be raised by the defendant to bar the plaintiff from recovery.
32. Ivey Plants, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 282 So. 2d 205, 208 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1973).
33. O'Connell v. Walt Disney World Co., 413 So. 2d 444, 447 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1982).
34. Ivey Plants, 282 So. 2d at 208. See Blanton v. Dold, 109 Mo. 64, 65, 18
S.W. 1149, 1151 (1892).
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496B comment e (1965).
36. Id. § 496B comment f.
37. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAW OF TORTS § 21.6 at 1185-87 (1956).
38. See Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, 31 N.J. 44, 48-49, 155 A.2d 90,
93 (1950).
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496C comments c-f (1965).
40. Meistrich, 31 N.J. at 56, 155 A.2d at 97.
41. Blackburn, 348 So. 2d at 290.
42. See O'Connell, 413 So. 2d 444, 448 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
1348 [Vol. 10
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A party who does not expressly assume the risk of injury, but volunta-
rily encounters a known risk, has impliedly assumed the risk. 3 His con-
duct creates an inference that he has consented to assume the risk. This
segment of the doctrine focuses on the plaintiff's behavior."" The plain-
tiff's conduct may be reasonable (strict) or unreasonable (qualified) .45
For example, if a person accepts a ride in a car which he knows has
defective brakes, his behavior may be characterized as unreasonable
secondary implied assumption of risk. However, if he accepts a ride in
the same car because it is late at night and it is the only available
transportation, his behavior may be described as reasonable secondary
implied assumption of risk.'6
As indicated, secondary assumption of risk may be characterized
as reasonable or unreasonable.' 7 When the plaintiff voluntarily en-
counters a known risk in an unreasonable manner, the defendant may
raise the defense of assumption of risk. In addition, the plaintiff is con-
tributorily negligent because he failed to act as a reasonable person.48
However, the latter defense cannot be raised if the plaintiff's behavior
in assuming the risk was reasonable. 9
In Florida, the defenses of secondary (unreasonable) implied as-
sumption of risk and contributory fault both served to completely ab-
solve the defendant from liability in spite of his negligence.50 Although
the Florida courts reached conflicting conclusions as to the similarity
and differences of these doctrines,51 the findings were not crucial to the
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496C (1965).
44. Id.
45. See Parker v. Redden, 421 S.W.2d 586 (Ky. 1967).
46. See Gavel v. Girton, 183 So. 2d 10, 13 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Mc-
Conville v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 15 Wis. 2d 374, 113 N.W.2d 14 (1962);
Kionka, Implied Assumption of Risk: Does it Survive Comparative Fault?, 3 S. ILL.
U.L.J. 371 (1982).
47. Blackburn, 348 So. 2d at 291.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 292.
50. E.g., Gavel v. Girton, 183 So. 2d 10, 13 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
51. The distinctions between assumption of risk and contributory negligence have
been clouded by Florida courts. "The doctrine of assumption of risk is only an engraft-
ment upon the well-established law applicable to contributory negligence." Martin v.
Plymouth Cordage Co., 209 So. 2d 481, 483 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
"[S]ince both [assumption of risk and contributory negligence] are available to
bar the action, it makes no differences what the defense is called." Kaplan v. Wolff,
198 So. 2d 103, 107 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
"There is little distinction between the two defenses of [assumption of risk and
1986] 1349
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outcome of these cases because the effect was the same. The plaintiff
was barred from recovery regardless of which defense was successfully
pled.
III. Hoffman v. Jones: Elimination of Contributory
Negligence
In 1973, the importance of distinguishing between these defenses
became crucial when the Supreme Court of Florida decided the
landmark case of Hoffman v. Jones.52
In Hoffman, a widow was precluded from recovering damages for
her husband's death, which was the result of the defendant's negli-
gence, because the plaintiff's decedent was found to be contributorily
negligent. 53 In order to alleviate the "harshness" 54 of this result, the
court held that contributory negligence was no longer a complete bar to
recovery. The principles of pure comparative negligence would apply
whenever the defense of contributory negligence was raised.55 There-
fore, if both the plaintiff and the defendant were negligent, the plain-
tiff's recovery would merely be reduced in proportion to the degree that
his negligence contributed to the injury.
The court stated that they adopted the system of comparative neg-
ligence because it was the most equitable system.56 Since comparative
negligence "equate[s] liability with fault," 57 the court concluded that
contributory negligence]. Both partake of exposure by a plaintiff to danger, knowledge
of which is attributed to plaintiff; actual knowledge in assumption of risk, and at least
constructive knowledge in contributory negligence." Rickerton v. Seaboard Airline
R.R. Co., 403 F.2d 836, 839 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1968).
In attempting to differentiate between contributory negligence and assumption of
risk, the Blackburn court stated, "[tihe leading case in Florida dealing with the dis-
tinction between the doctrines recognizes that '[a]t times the line of demarcation be-
tween contributory negligence and assumption of risk is exceedingly difficult to de-
fine.'" Blackburn, 348 So. 2d at 289 (quoting Byers v. Gunn, 81 So. 2d 723, 727 (Fla.
1955)).
52. 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973); See Timmons & Silvis, Pure Comparative Neg-
ligence in Florida: A New Adventure in the Common Law, 28 U. OF MIAMI L. REv.
737, 766 (1974).
53. Hoffman, 280 So. 2d at 437.
54. Id.
55. See Timmons & Silvis, supra note 52, at 743-749.
56. Hoffman, 280 So. 2d at 438.
57. Id.
1350 [Vol. 10
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this was "the better doctrine."58
Although the implementation of this system raised questions about
corollary doctrines, the court did not answer these questions. 9 The
court suggested that the lower courts look to the case law decided
under a Florida railroad statute.60 This statute delineated a compara-
tive negligence system in the limited area of negligence actions against
the railroad companies. However, there are no cases dealing with as-
sumption of risk under this statute. A provision of the statute stated
that a person who consents to the injury cannot recover.6' It has been
suggested that this exclusionary provision resulted in the absence of
any case law applicable to assumption of risk. 2
With the adoption of comparative negligence, the courts were
faced with two threshold problems: 1) the courts had to reexamine the
differences between assumption of risk and contributory negligence;
and 2) the courts had to determine whether assumption of risk survived
the adoption of comparative negligence. Predictably the confusion sur-
rounding assumption of risk generated conflicting trial and appellate
court decisions.63
58. Id.
59. Id. at 439.
60. FLA. STAT. § 768.06 (1977), repealed by 1979 Fla. Laws C. 79-163 § 6. This
statute was passed in 1887. It applied only to actions involving the railroads. The stat-
ute was held unconstitutional in Georgia S. & Fla. R.R. v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 175
So. 2d 39 (Fla. 1965), based on due process and equal protective grounds.
61. "No person shall recover damages from a railroad company for injury to
himself or his property, where the same is done by his consent, or is caused by his own
negligence." FLA. STAT. § 768.06 (1977), repealed by 1979 Fla. Laws C. 79-163 § 6.
62. Fisher & Wax, Comparative Negligence: Unanswered Questions, 47 FLA.
B.J. 566, 568 (1973).
63. See, e.g., Dorta v. Blackburn, 302 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974)
(rev'd 348 So. 2d 287, on remand 350 So. 2d 25) held that defense of assumption of
risk continues to bar recovery in negligence actions despite adoption of a comparative
negligence system.
But see Rea v. Leadership Housing, Inc., 312 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1975) (aff'd Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287, on remand 350 So. 2d 25); Parker v.
Maule Industries, Inc., 321 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Hall v. Holton,
330 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
These decisions stated that the defense of assumption of risk was no longer a com-
plete bar to recovery.
1986] 1351
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IV. Assumption of Risk in Florida
A. Blackburn v. Dorta
1. Elimination of Implied Assumption of Risk
In 1977, the Florida Supreme Court sought to eliminate resulting
inconsistencies by determining the effect of the adoption of comparative
negligence on the doctrine of assumption of risk. The court granted
certiorari under conflict certiorari jurisdiction6 4 to review three conflict-
ing District Court of Appeal decisions. The cases of Dorta v. Black-
burn,5 Leadership Housing v. Rea,16 and Maule Industries v.
Parker,6 7 were consolidated for review.
In the landmark case of Blackburn v. Dorta, the Florida Supreme
Court held that the doctrine of implied assumption of risk did not sur-
vive the adoption of comparative negligence.18 The court based its opin-
ion on the premise that if the defenses of implied assumption of risk
and contributory negligence are the same then assumption of risk must
be abolished pursuant to the holding in Hoffman v. Jones.69 In addi-
tion, the Blackburn court stated that aspects. of implied assumption of
risk which overlap other principles of negligence will also be elimi-
nated.7 0 To reach this decision, the court systematically defined "a pot-
pourri of labels, concepts, definitions, thoughts and doctrines"7' which
comprise the doctrine of assumption of risk.
64. See .FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3).
65. 302 So. 2d 450. The plaintiff, Kevin Blackburn, was injured while he was a
passenger in a dune buggy operated by the defendant. The trial court refused to give
an instruction on assumption of risk and the Florida Third District Court of Appeal
affirmed the trial court's action.
66. 312 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975). The plaintiff was injured
when she tripped in a hole in her driveway. She alleged the defendant negligently in-
stalled the driveway. The trial court granted a summary judgment to the defendant.
However, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed and stated that assumption of
risk was not a bar to recovery.
67. 321 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975). Plaintiff was injured because
of the defendant's negligent operation of a truck. At trial, the defendant prevailed.
However, the plaintiff contended that it was error to instruct the jury that if plaintiff
assumed the risk of injury, he was completely barred from recovery. The Fourth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal agreed and reversed the decision.
68. Blackburn, 348 So. 2d at 293.
69. Id. at 289.
70. Id. at 291.
71. Id. at 290.
1352 [Vol. 10
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After excluding express assumption of risk from their analysis,72
the court discarded each aspect of implied assumption of risk for vari-
ous reasons. The court described primary implied assumption of risk as
either a lack of duty to protect the plaintiff from the inherent risks of
the plaintiff's activities or that the duty owed by the defendant was not
breached. This aspect of assumption of risk is abrogated because the
concepts of duty and breach are already included in the analysis to
determine the defendant's negligence.7 3
Secondary implied assumption of risk included reasonable and un-
reasonable behavior. Since unreasonable implied assumption of risk is
so similar to contributory negligence and it espouses no separate func-
tion, the court merged this aspect of secondary implied assumption of
risk into contributory negligence. 4 Reasonable implied assumption of
risk is also eliminated. The court reasoned that the retention of this
concept would be unfair and inconsistent with the explicit equitable
reasoning applied in Hoffman v. Jones. The inequity of granting recov-
ery to a plaintiff who unreasonably assumed a risk and denying recov-
ery to a plaintiff whose behavior was reasonable is readily apparent.7 5
Equitable considerations were a collateral basis of the court's deci-
sion. The court clearly stated that their decision would have been the
same based on the reasoning in Hoffman v. Jones.7 6
The Hoffman decision underscored the court's determination to re-
solve cases as equitably as possible.7 7 In adopting comparative negli-
gence, the Hoffman court indicated that the "equation of liability with
fault"78 to determine the plaintiff's recovery achieves this goal. The
Blackburn court adopted this formula. The court held that the defenses
of implied assumption of risk and contributory negligence are merged.
Thereafter, when the defense of implied assumption of risk is success-
fully raised, the principles of comparative negligence will govern the
effect of this defense on the plaintiff's recovery. 79
72. Id.
73. Id. at 291.
74. Id. at 291-92.
75. Id. at 293. The Blackburn court stated: "There is little to commend this
doctrine of implied-pure or strict assumption of risk and our research discloses no Flor-
ida cases in which it has been applied." Id. at 291.
76. Id. at 292.
77. Hoffman, 280 So. 2d at 438.
78. Id.
79. Blackburn, 348 So. 2d at 293.
1986] 1353
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2. Treatment of Express Assumption of Risk
Although express assumption of risk generally encompassed only a
contractual concept based on actual oral or written consent to a risk of
injury,80 the confusion as to the parameters of this doctrine was fos-
tered by dicta in the Blackburn decision. The court stated:
It should be pointed out that we are not here concerned with
express assumption of risk which is a contractual concept outside
the purview of this inquiry and upon which we express no opinion
herein. . . . Included within the definition of express assumption of
risk are express contracts not to sue for injury or loss which may
thereafter be occasioned by the convenantee's negligence as well as
situations in which actual consent exists such as where one volunta-
rily participates in a contact sport. 81
The trial and appellate courts in Florida have viewed the non-in-
clusive words "such as" as an invitation to expand the doctrine of ex-
press assumption of risk beyond the Blackburn definition.
Traditionally, the courts applied express assumption of risk to con-
tracts, releases and waivers.8 2 Implied assumption of risk was applied in
all other situations in which a person voluntarily encountered a known
risk and therefore, indicated his consent to assume the risk. These cases
included sporting and recreational activities. Historically, however, the
lower courts often used the generic term assumption of risk without
indicating which facet of the doctrine they were applying. 8
Prior to Blackburn the commingling of these terms was not critical
to the outcome of the case. However, after Blackburn, the distinctions
were crucial as to whether the plaintiff was precluded from recovering
damages for his injury.
B. Interpretation of Blackburn: Definition of Express Assump-
tion of Risk by Florida Courts
Subsequently, the trial and appellate courts interpreted the defini-
80. City of Jacksonville Beach v. Jones, 101 Fla. 96, 133 So. 562 (1931).
81. Blackburn, 348 So. 2d at 290.
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496B comment a (1965).
83. See Gulfstream Park Racing Assoc. v. Miller, 119 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1960) (horse racing); Evans v. Green, 251 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App.) cert. denied, 253 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 1971) (accidental shooting); Rindley v.
Goldberg, 297 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (golf).
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tion of express assumption of risk as stated in Blackburn in a decidedly
expansive manner. Florida courts have determined that express as-
sumption of risk remains a total bar to recovery in four situations: con-
tractual waivers, contact sports, aberrant forms of non-contact sports,
and professional non-contact sports. An examination of the cases which
comprise this area is helpful to understand the present status of the
doctrine.
1. Contracts
The Fifth District Court Appeal addressed the issue of express as-
sumption of risk in O'Connell v. Walt Disney World.84 In this case the
plaintiff, a minor, was injured while on a guided horseback ride. The
plaintiffs alleged that the negligent actions of the defendant caused the
horses to stampede, resulting in plaintiff's injury. The trial court
granted summary judgment to the defendant, and the plaintiff ap-
pealed. The appellate court reversed the trial court, holding that the
release signed by the plaintiffs parents did not contain the specific lan-
guage necessary to absolve the defendants from liability.85
The court added to the expansion of the doctrine in two ways. The
opinion repeatedly altered the Blackburn definition of express assump-
tion of risk. The court incorrectly characterized the defense as applying
to participation in a "sport," "sport situation," "contact or competitive
sports," and "an activity such as a sport."88 The court also examined
plaintiff's behavior to determine if the defense of express assumption of
risk could be applied because the plaintiff was engaged in an aberrant
form of horseback riding.87 However, there was no evidence of partici-
pation in an unusual or aberrant form of horseback riding. Therefore,
the court stated that the defense did not apply in this situation. This
analysis serves to add momentum to the use of a concept which is
outside the supreme court's definition of the defense.88
The opinion does lend some insight into the reasons for the courts
advocation of the expansion of the doctrine. The court stated that the
theory of primary implied assumption of risk is more applicable to this
84. 413 So. 2d 444 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
85. Id. at 447.
86. Id. at 447-48.
87. Id. at 447.
88. Although the plaintiff in this case was not barred from recovery, the court's
language may be indicative of its inclination to apply the defense of express assumption
of risk if the plaintiff participated in an aberrant form of horseback riding.
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situation.89 This theory is usually applied to inherently dangerous activ-
ities. If the plaintiff was engaged in such an activity, the defendant
would have no duty to protect him from these risks unless the defend-
ant added to these risks. However, this defense is no longer available
because Blackburn held that "[t]his branch or trunk of assumption of
risk is subsumed in the principle of negligence itself."90 Therefore, in
order to continue to bar the plaintiff from recovery, the courts must
resort to the legal fiction of applying express assumption of risk.
Contractual assumption of risk is discussed further in Van Tuyn v.
Zurich American Insurance Co.91 The Fourth District Court of Appeal
stated that the waiver signed by the plaintiff before she rode and was
injured by a mechanical bull ride at defendant's club did not bar recov-
ery. The court held that the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment to the defendant. The waiver was invalid because it did not
contain specific language manifesting intent to either release or indem-
nify the club for its own negligence.92
After concluding that the release did not preclude recovery, the
court sought to determine whether the plaintiff expressly assumed the
risk by riding the mechanical bull. They stated that this defense was
unavailable unless plaintiff subjectively understood the risks inherent in
mechanical bull riding and actually intended to assume these risks.
Therefore, the case was remanded to determine whether these factors
could be proven.
Although the plaintiff was not denied recovery, it is disconcerting
that the court attempted to apply the defense to this case since
mechanical bull riding is not a contact sport.93 The court's discussion
may be explained by its statement of the facets of the defense. The
court states, "[f]or express assumption of risk to be valid, either by
contract or by voluntary participation in an activity, it must be clear
that the plaintiff understood that she was assuming the particular con-
duct by the defendant which caused her injury." '94 It should be noted
that the court abandoned the Blackburn definition and substituted the
89. Id. at 448.
90. Blackburn, 348 So. 2d at 291.
91. 447 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
92. Id. at 320.
93. Of course it is arguable whether mechanical bull riding is a contact sport.
This author views a contact sport as one in which contact is a certainty (part of the
game) and not merely a possibility. Otherwise, all recreational activities could be
viewed as contact sports.
94. Id. (emphasis added).
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word "activity" in place of "contact sport." Furthermore, in dicta, the
Fourth District Court of Appeal in Van Tuyn agreed with the Fifth
District Court of Appeal in O'Connell that this situation is more
clearly analyzed as primary implied assumption of risk.95
2. Aberrant Forms of Non-Contact Sports
In Strickland v. Roberts,96 the plaintiff, a waterskier, was injured
when he hit a stationary dock. Strickland was trying to spray water on
some youngsters sunbathing on the dock by skiing as close as possible
to the dock. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defend-
ant who was driving the tow boat. On appeal, the Fifth District Court
of Appeal agreed with the trial court that the defendant was not negli-
gent. Although this finding resolved all the issues raised on appeal, the
District Court seized the opportunity to discuss the application of ex-
press assumption of risk to the facts before it.
In dictum, the court noted that Blackburn excluded contact sports
from the abrogation of assumption of risk as a defense. Judge Cobb,
writing for the majority, stated that usually waterskiing was not a con-
tact sport. However, the plaintiff was engaged in an aberrant form of
the sport. Therefore, the court inferred that the consequence of engag-
ing in unusual forms of sport was the application of express assumption
of risk. The court concluded that "[t]he risk of hitting a dock inheres
in the sport of narrowly missing it. Strickland having assumed the risk
of his game, played it one too often and lost."' 7 Thus the expansion of
express assumption of risk to include aberrant forms of non-contact
sports was implemented.
In Gary v. Party-time Co.,98 the plaintiff was injured while roller-
skating down a ramp holding ski poles. The trial court granted a di-
rected verdict to the defendant based solely on a release signed by the
plaintiff. The Third District Court of Appeal, without discussion, af-
firmed the trial court's determination as to the sufficiency of the written
release. 99 Although the trial court rejected the validity of express as-
sumption of risk (based on participation in a situation such as a contact
95. Id. at 321.
96. 382 So. 2d 1338 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), petition for rev. denied, 389 So.
2d 1115 (Fla. 1980).
97. Id. at 1340.
98. Strickland, 434 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
99. Id. at 339-40.
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sport) and it was not an issue on appeal, 100 the appellate court took this
opportunity to interpret the non-contractual aspect of express assump-
tion of risk as stated in Blackburn. This discussion is premised by the
court's approval of the Strickland court's expansion of the doctrine to
include "aberrant forms of non-contact sports."10' The court then ap-
plied the Strickland rationale to this case. The court stated that roller
skating down a ramp holding ski poles is aberrant behavior. Therefore,
the court concluded that the plaintiff's action was within Strickland's
definition of express assumption of risk. In a confusing attempt to jus-
tify the Strickland conclusion, the Gary court indicated that participa-
tion in an aberrant form of non-contact sport is somehow analogous to
participation in contact sports.
The Third District Court of Appeal further confused the issue by
stating that the plaintiff is barred from recovery on the basis of the
release "coupled" 102 or "combined"10 3 with voluntary aberrant acts.L
04
However, Blackburn states that express assumption of risk is a valid
defense on the basis of "express contracts not to sue as well as situa-
tions in which actual consent exists such as where one voluntarily par-
ticipates in a contact sport."'' 0 5 The Gary court circumvented the re-
lease as the sole basis for the directed verdict in order to reinforce the
inclusion of aberrant forms of non-contact sports within the definition
of express assumption of risk. It characterized the release merely as
additional "evidence of actual consent to assume the risk of injury"1' 0 6
and not as an express contract not to sue. 01
In Caravel v. Alverez, 08 aberrant forms of non-contact sports
were again included within the scope of express assumption of risk.
Plaintiff's decedent died as a result of a fall while horseback riding.
The jury determined that the plaintiff expressly assumed the risk of his
injuries. The trial court then granted a judgment in favor of the de-
fendant. Appellants argued that the court erred in giving the instruc-
tion on express assumption of risk to the jury, since horsebacking riding
could not be considered a contact sport. In affirming the trial court's
100. Id. at 339 n.3.
101. Id. at 339-40.
102. Id. at 340.
103. Id. at 339.
104. Id.
105. Blackburn, 348 So. 2d at 290.
106. Gary, 434 So. 2d at 339 n.3.
107. Blackburn, 348 So. 2d at 290.
108. 462 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
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decision, the Third District Court of Appeal stated that the jury may
have decided that riding double on one horse was "an aberrant form of
the sport of horseback riding."109 Therefore, the instruction was proper.
The concurrence implied that this situation was more applicable to
the theory of primary implied assumption of risk. Judge Ferguson
stated that "appellees breached no duty owed to the deceased." 110 Al-
though this theory was raised by the defendant, the majority opinion
stated that it was unnecessary to address this issue.1 '
In Robbins v. Department of Natural Resources,"2 the First Dis-
trict Court of Appeal joined the Third, Fourth and Fifth District
Courts of Appeal in Florida in agreement that the doctrine of express
assumption of risk may be raised when the situation involves aberrant
forms of activities. In Robbins, the plaintiff became a quadriplegic as a
result of diving into shallow water at a public park. The accident oc-
curred the second time he went into the lake. However, he testified that
he was not aware of the depth of the water. The trial court granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment." 3 The DNR successfully
argued that Robbins should be barred recovery because he had ex-
pressly assumed the risk of injury. The First District Court of Appeal
reversed the lower court's decision. On appeal, the court held that sum-
mary judgment was precluded because the evidence presented material
issues of fact."24 Robbins argued further that, as a matter of law, the
doctrine of express assumption of risk was not applicable in this case.
The District Court of Appeals rejected this argument. 11 5 The court em-
phatically endorsed the application of this doctrine to aberrant forms of
activities.
Such an aberrant form of participation in the recreational activity
of diving would be an appropriate occasion for the application of
the defense of express assumption of risk, notwithstanding the fact
that diving is, of course, not a contact sport and involves no other
participants, and that no formal release, consent or waiver form
was involved.' 16
109. Id. at 1157.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1157 n.1.
112. 468 So. 2d 1041 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
113. Id. at 1043.
114. Id. at 1044.
115. Id. at 1043.
116. Id.
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The Robbins court stated that if Robbins was subjectively aware
of the depth of the water and the presence of rocks on the bottom of
the lake, and he knew of the risks but voluntarily dove into the water
anyway, the defense of express assumption of risk could be raised.117
The court cited Kuehner in support of this conclusion. The application
of Kuehner to this case is disconcerting. Kuehner applied this criteria
to a case in which the injury was caused by participation in a contact
sport-karate. 118 The injury in the Robbins case occurred while the
plaintiff was diving. Clearly, diving is not a contact sport. Although the
Robbins court noted this significant difference, the court did not sup-
port their statement by further reasoning. This decision lends addi-
tional encouragement to the inclusion of aberrant forms of activities
within the limits of the assumption of risk doctrine.
3. Contact Sports
An opportunity to clarify the status of this defense was presented
when the supreme court granted certiorari to answer the following cer-
tified question asked by the Third District Court of Appeal in Kuehner
v. Green:"9 "Does express assumption of risk absolutely bar a plain-
tiffs recovery where he engages in a contact sport with another partici-
pant who injures him without deliberate attempt to injure?"'20
In Kuehner, a participant in a karate practice session was injured
when his partner performed a "leg sweep." The Third District Court of
Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision that express assumption of
risk served to absolve the defendant from liability. The Florida Su-
preme Court reviewed and affirmed the decision but did not answer the
certified question.12 The court stated that the question was "inappo-
site"'' 22 to the present case. Since the plaintiff was absolutely barred
from recovery and the evidence did not show that the defendant in-
tended to injure the plaintiff this conclusion is unclear. The supreme
court's reasoning failed to clarify the issue and, in fact, added to the
increasing confusion surrounding the doctrine of express assumption of
risk.
117. Id. at 1043-44.
118. Kuehner, 436 So. 2d at 80-81.
119. 406 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
120. Id. at 1161 (emphasis added).
121. Kuehner v. Green, 436 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1983).
122. Id. at 81.
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The supreme court did take this opportunity to extrapolate on the
impact of the doctrine of express assumption of risk as it arises in "sit-
uations in which actual consent exists such as where one voluntarily
participates in a contact sport."'12 3 The court stated that the viability of
contact sports as recreation is dependent on the defense of express as-
sumption of risk.' 24 However, since the basis of the adoption of com-
parative negligence was the desire to foster an equitable relationship
between liability and fault, the court warned that the doctrine of ex-
press assumption of risk must not be used to incur the same harsh un-
fairness as contributory negligence. The doctrine must be "compatible"
with the comparative negligence system.125 If express assumption of
risk is expanded beyond its intended scope, it may evade the intention
of the court's adoption of comparative negligence as evidenced by the
subsequent merger of assumption of risk and contributory
negligence. 126
In defining the boundaries of the doctrine of express assumption of
risk, the court emphatically stated that the contact sport participant
"does not automatically assume all risks" merely by participation. 27 It
noted that voluntary consent to a specific risk is the foundation of ex-
press assumption of risk. The jury must address several issues in deter-
mining whether the participant actually consented to a specific risk. If
the jury finds that the plaintiff subjectively appreciated the risk which
caused the injury and voluntarily participated, express assumption of
risk can be raised by the defendant. The plaintiff's consent relieves the
defendant of liability from the latter's negligence. But if the injury-
causing risk would not have been foreseen by a reasonable man, the
plaintiff's recovery is not affected. However, if a reasonable man would
have expected the risk, the plaintiff's recovery is governed by compara-
123. Id. at 79 (quoting Blackburn, 348 So. 2d at 290).
124. Kuehner, 436 So. 2d at 79. It would be easier to implement this interest in a
recreational sport by simply holding that the defendant had no duty not to physically
make contact with the plaintiff.
125. Id. at 79-80.
126. Comment, Torts-Assumption of Risk-Comparative Negligence, 16 DUQ. L.
REv. 417, 424 n.38 (1978). The Supreme Court of Florida expressed its interest in this
problem in the Kuehner opinion. The court stated "for express assumption of risk to
operate compatibly within our comparative negligence system, courts of law must fully
appreciate the scope and proper applications of the doctrine." Kuehner, 436 So. 2d at
80.
127. Kuehner, 436 So. 2d at 80.
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tive negligence principles."' 8 The state high court concluded that the
special verdict submitted to the Kuehner jury included the factors nec-
essary to make a proper analysis of the application of express assump-
tion of risk.129 Therefore, the decision of the Third District Court of
Appeal was affirmed.
It is significant that the factors that the court examined to deter-
mine the appropriate application of express assumption of risk in the
context of contact sports are the very same factors which were neces-
sary before Blackburn to support the defense of implied assumption of
risk.130
In addition, the inclusion of contact sports within the context of
express assumption of risk, instead of implied assumption of risk, is
important. It is suggested that consent to actual contact which is neces-
sitated by this type of activity justifies this placement.' However, this
reasoning cannot be similarly justified relative to non-contact recrea-
tional activities. 3 2 Unlike contact sports, participation in non-contact
activities does not constitute the same consent.
The special concurring opinion of Justice Boyd in Kuehner 3 ad-
dressed the goal the lower courts are trying to achieve by their inter-
pretation of Blackburn.34 The Justice reiterated that traditional reluc-
tance to allow recovery for injuries incurred by sports participants. In
order to retain this policy, Justice Boyd suggested an alternative.
Rather than the "absurd legal semantics which classify voluntary par-
ticipation in a contact sport as an 'express' assumption of the risk," the
Justice recommended that the scope of liability may be reduced by
holding that "[t]he only duty that a person participating in a contact
sport has toward a fellow participant is to refrain from intentional or
128. Id.
129. "Did the Plaintiff, CLIFFORD R. KUEHNER, know of the existence of
the danger complained of, realize and appreciate the possibility of injury as a result of
such danger; and, having reasonable opportunity to avoid it, voluntarily and deliber-
ately exposed himself to the danger complained of?" Id. at 79.
130. The defense of assumption of risk is applicable when the plaintiff knows and
appreciates the risk of danger and voluntarily consents to exposure to that particular
risk. Bartholf v. Baker, 71 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1954); Byers v. Gunn, 81 So. 2d 723 (Fla.
1955); Brady v. Kane, Ill So. 2d 472 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
131. Petitioner's Initial Brief on the Merits at 11, Ashcroft v. Calder Race
Course, Inc., 464 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985), rev'd, 492 So. 2d 1309
(Fla. 1986).
132. Id.
133. Kuehner, 436 So. 2d at 81.
134. Id. at 81-82.
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reckless misconduct that is not customary to the sport game." 135
In Kuehner, the court limited the application of the doctrine to
contact sports and the inherent risks associated with them.136 It did not
answer the certified question or clarify the limitations of the application
of the doctrine beyond Kuehner or contact sports.
4. Professional Non-Contact Sports
Possible devastating consequences can result from the application
of express assumption of risk to professional non-contact sports. In
Ashcroft v. Calder Race Course, Inc.,137 a jockey at the defendant's
track received injuries during a race which resulted in his becoming a
quadriplegic. The jury found that the negligent design of the track
caused his injury. However, the jury also found that although the plain-
tiff was not negligent, he assumed the risk of injury. Plaintiff and de-
fendant both appealed,138 Notwithstanding the fact that Ashcroft had
not signed a release and that horse racing is not a contact sport, the
Third District Court of Appeal held that the defense of express as-
sumption of risk was applicable to professional horse racing, and
thereby completely barred Ashcroft from any recovery. 39
The Third District relied upon Blackburn and Kuehner. The court
stated that the Blackburn court did not limit express assumption of risk
to contracts and contact sports. The appellate court stated that such an
interpretation would be too constricted: "The Blackburn court clearly
contemplated other professional sporting activity when it used the term
'such as' when defining those cases in which actual consent exists and
the express assumption-of-risk defense is available." 40 The court also
held that the special verdict given to the jury was within the standard
expressed by Kuehner.
The Ashcroft court's interpretation of the Blackburn and Kuehner
opinions is confusing. The Ashcroft court ascribes an intention to the
135. Id. at 81.
136. Id. at 80.
137. Ashcroft v. Calder Race Course, Inc., 464 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1985), revd, 492 So. 2d 1309 (Fla. 1986).
138. The trial judge refused to apply the jury's finding of express assumption of
risk. Instead, the judge granted a remittitur reducing the plaintiff's award from the
jury of $10 million to $5 million. The plaintiff refused to accept the remittitur. Ash-
croft, 464 So. 2d at 1253-54 (Baskin, J. dissenting).
139. Ashcroft, 464 So. 2d at 1251.
140. Id.
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supreme court to include professional non-contact sports within the def-
inition of express assumption of risk. 41 This conclusion seems faulty in
light of the supreme court's concern that "[i]f contact sports are to
continue to serve a legitimate recreational function in our society ex-
press assumption of risk must remain a viable defense to negligence
actions spawned from these athletic endeavors." 142 In addition, al-
though the jury instruction1 43 was in accordance with the Kuehner
standard, 4 Kuehner applied this instruction to a fact pattern involving
karate, a contact sport. The Ashcroft court ignored the threshold re-
quirement that the injury resulted from participation in a contact sport.
Also, the Kuehner court clearly limited the application of the doc-
trine to "those bodily contacts inherent in the chances taken. 1 45 Since
negligent track design is not within the inherent risks of horse racing,
Calder should not have been allowed to raise the defense which barred
Ashcroft's recovery.
Most important, Ashcroft ignores the Kuehner reiteration of the
supreme court's equitable objectives as stated in Hoffman v. Jones.1 46
This equitable concept was advanced by Hoffman's abrogation of con-
tributory negligence and the discarding of implied assumption of risk in
Blackburn.
In her Ashcroft dissent, 4' Judge Baskin stated that she "would
narrow the focus of the inquiry to the propriety of the jury instruction
on express assumption of risk under the facts of this case. 148 In a
straightforward analysis, she concluded that Ashcroft did not assume
the risk of injury by express contract or participation in a contact sport.
A further examination of the facts in light of the inherent risks of horse
racing also does not absolve Calder of liability. Although a participant
may assume inherent risks, Judge Baskin concluded that "the danger-
ous condition created by Calder [is not] an inherent danger in the sport
of horse racing. '"49 Finally, Ashcroft's behavior was neither unusual
nor aberrant. Therefore, according to Judge Baskin, the jury instruc-
tion was incorrect and a new trial should have been granted.
141. See supra text accompanying note 125.
142. Kuehner, 436 So. 2d at 79.
143. Fla. Standard Jury Instruction (Civil) § 3.8.
144. See supra text accompanying note 128.
145. Kuehner, 436 So. 2d at 80.
146. Id.
147. Ashcroft, 464 So. 2d at 1252.
148. Id. at 1254.
149. Id. at 1255.
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The Supreme Court of Florida granted review in Ashcroft v. Cal-
der Race Course, Inc.1 50 It was hoped that this opinion would give ex-
plicit guidance to the lower courts as to the application of express as-
sumption of risk in Florida.
The Florida Supreme Court's review of Ashcroft did not result in
an emphatical clarification of contexts in which the doctrine of express
assumption of risk may be viable. In its reconsideration of the Ashcroft
decision by the Third District Court of Appeal, the supreme court held
that "there was no express assumption of risk with respect to the negli-
gent placement of the exit gap and it was error for the judge to instruct
the jury on assumption of risk." 1 1 Pursuant to Kuehner, the court
stated that the doctrine only applies to risks inherent in the particular
sport.152 The court agreed with Judge Baskin's dissent 53 that negligent
placement of the exit gap was not such a risk.154 Therefore, the court
reversed the decision of the lower court and ordered the reinstatement
of the $10 million jury award to Ashcroft. 155
However the supreme court did not expressly state that the doc-
trine of express assumption of risk is applicable to horse racing. In be-
ginning their analysis by stating that they are "[a]ssuming that express
assumption of risk applies to horse racing.. ,"."I the court extenuates
the inclusion of the sport of horse racing within the doctrine. Arguably,
the court has failed to make a policy decision concerning the doctrine's
applicability to horse racing. The court has skirted that issue by hold-
ing that the negligent placement of the exit gap wasn't an inherent risk
of horse racing. Therefore, it was unnecesessary for the court to decide
if express assumption of risk was applicable to the activity in which the
plaintiff was participating when he was injured.
150. Ashcroft v. Calder Race Course, Inc., 464 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1985), rev'd, 492 So. 2d 1309 (Fla. 1986).
151. Ashcroft v. Calder Race Course, Inc., 11 Fla. L. Weekly 307, 308 (July 11,
1986).
152. Id. at 307 (quoting Kuehner v. Green, 436 So. 2d 78, 80 (Fla. 1983)).
153. See supra notes 147-149 and accompanying text.
154. Ashcroft, 492 So. 2d at 1311.
155. Id. at 1314. The court also based their decision on the duty of reasonable
care which a landowner owes to an invitee. Further the court held that the trial judge
had abused his discretion in granting a remittitur. Id. at 1313.
156. Id. at 1311.
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V. Options
There is a myriad of approaches available to the Supreme Court
of Florida to resolve the confusion regarding the parameters of express
assumption of risk. Although the particular approach chosen may be
disadvantageous to plaintiffs, it is of paramount importance that the
court delineate a clear standard that the lower courts can follow in a
consistent and predictable manner. Further, injured parties will be bet-
ter able to judge the viability of a possible complaint if a straightfor-
ward test is adopted by the court.
The Supreme Court of Florida may choose to put its seal of ap-
proval on the application of express assumption of risk to situations
involving contracts and contact sports.'57 However, even in cases involv-
ing contracts and contact sports, courts will have to decide on the scope
of the doctrine on a case-by-case adjudication.
The doctrine will preclude recovery in those instances when a
party has expressly consented to expose himself to a particular risk,
either by contract or participation in a contact sport. These sports may
include wrestling, football, karate, hockey, and similar activities where
consent to contact is a necessary part of the game.
However, if the contact which was the proximate cause of his in-
jury was not a normal part of the sporting activity, then the injured
plaintiff will be allowed to recover. These instances may include inten-
tional or reckless conduct, and behavior which is a violation of the
rules. A case-by-case examination of the type of action which caused
the injury would determine whether the defense of express assumption
of risk should be applied to bar the plaintiff's recovery.
The obvious weakness of this proposal is that determinations based
on this method may yield inconsistent rulings which would create con-
fusion as to the parties rights and obligations under Florida law. Nu-
merous decisions would be necessary before a framework of consented
behavior could be formulated. In addition, this option abandons the
traditional legal theory which limited express assumption of risk to con-
tracts or other forms of express agreement.
However, this course is in accordance with the Florida Supreme
Court's decision in Kuehner v. Green. The fact situation in Kuehner
involved a contact sport and the court did not give any indication of an
157. The proposal is merely consistent with the treatment of express assumption
of risk by the Florida Supreme Court. The supreme court has never applied the doc-
trine of express assumption of risk beyond contracts or contact sports.
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intention to further expand the doctrine of express assumption of risk
beyond contracts and contact sports.
The supreme court may also attempt to reconcile the various lower
court decisions by reaffirming the fact that Florida has adopted a sys-
tem of comparative negligence and, consequently, assumption of risk is
no longer a viable defense. Therefore, in those situations where the de-
fense of assumption of risk would have been raised, a correct analysis
would require a finding of no duty owed.
In theory, this option revives primary assumption of risk. In other
words, it is lack of duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff that
precludes recovery rather than a finding that the plaintiff had expressly
assumed the risk of injury. For example, in the context of football, the
players have no duty to protect each other from anticipated contact.
Several states have totally abolished all assumption of risk termi-
nology on the rationale that "the bench and bar. . . unhappily cling to
the terminology of assumption of risk and continue to be misled by it
even while purporting to think of it as merely a convertible equivalent
of negligence . . . ."15 It is suggested that contract law competently
governs express assumption of risk.159
The Utah Supreme Court in Jacobson Construction v. Structo-
Lite Engineering60 stated that "[w]hat is important is the concept em-
bodied in the comparative negligence statute, and the particular labels
assigned to the type of fault should not interfere therewith.",,
This proposition""' is consistent with the evolution of Florida negli-
gence law. It avoids a departure from the principles of a comparative
negligence system which eschews the complete denial of recovery to an
injured plaintiff. Yet, this option also allows the Florida Supreme
Court to make a more definitive public policy statement.
The trial court's analysis would begin with an inquiry into the
scope of duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff under each partic-
ular fact situation. This eliminates the necessity for the jury to consider
the application of assumption of risk in reaching its verdict.
When the jury makes its determination as to the defendant's negli-
158. McGrath v. American Cyanamid Co., 41 N.J. 272, 273, 196 A.2d 238, 240
(1963).
159. See Jacobsen Construction Co., Inc. v. Structo-lite Engineering, 619 P.2d
306, 310 (Utah 1980); James, Assumption of Risk, 61 YALE L.J. 141 (1952).
160. Jacobsen Construction, 619 P.2d at 311.
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., McGrath, 41 N.J. at 272, 196 A.2d at 238.
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gence, it will be resolving as well the issue of whether the plaintiff is
precluded from recovering damages. Therefore, the jury's findings as to
damages will be in keeping with the equity of comparative negligence
principles.
Under existing decisions the jury can easily become confused by
the process of determining defendant's negligence, plaintiff's contribu-
tory negligence, as well as considering non-contractual express assump-
tion of risk.
An example of this confusion is demonstrated by the verdict in
Ashcroft. Although defendant Calder Race Course, Inc. was negligent,
plaintiff Ashcroft, who was not negligent, was completely barred from
recovery because the jury found that Ashcroft had expressly assumed
that risk of injury. 163
Finally, the supreme court may choose to allow the expansion of
express assumption of risk in negligence actions to include contracts as
well as all recreational and sports activities. Defendants will be permit-
ted to raise the defense of contributory negligence to reduce the plain-
tiff's recovery and assumption of risk to bar recovery.
The plaintiff will be prevented from recovering damages in a wide
range of activities. Since these activities were formerly included within
the area of implied assumption of risk, this would signal a re-examina-
tion of Blackburn. A clear statement of the risks which the plaintiff is
deemed to have assumed is required. Otherwise, participation in recrea-
tion activities may be discouraged by the certain preclusion of recovery
for injuries suffered.
This approach is especially harmful because participation in recre-
ational sports activities has a positive effect on the individual as well as
the entire community. This type of activity should be fostered and not
discouraged.1 6 4
VI. Conclusion
Throughout the State of Florida, the doctrine of express assump-
tion of risk has been expanding haphazardly. The Florida Supreme
163. Ashcroft, 464 So. 2d at 1251. Ashcroft knew and appreciated the specific
danger caused by the design defect in the track. It is arguable whether his choice to
ride was voluntary. However, the issue is whether the jury should have been instructed
as to the defense of express assumption of risk.
164. Segoviano v. Housing Auth. of Staniseous County, 143 Cal. App. 3d 162,
175, 191 Cal. Rptr. 578, 587-88 (Cal. 5th Ct. App. 1983) (flag football).
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Court should define the parameters of the doctrine in a clear and defi-
nite manner to avoid the abrogation of the comparative negligence sys-
tem. The stature of this system must be supported by the body which
created it. Not only is it unfair to bar recovery to a party in a negli-
gence action, merely because he has made the reasonable decision to
participate in a sporting activity, but it is not in keeping with the spirit
of the supreme court's decision in Hoffman v. Jones to adopt a compar-
ative negligence system in Florida which "equate[s] liability with
fault."16 2
Susan S. Faerber
165. Hoffman, 280 So. 2d at 438.
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